It's about making life harder for exploiters ...

With increasing complexity, attack vectors increase exponential, even with multiple audits, the security risk remains.
An approach to security involves designing systems in ways that make exploits less attractive or outright economically unfeasible for attackers.

Here are some strategies

Additional Internal Accounting

One straightforward method is enhancing internal accounting mechanisms. A minor addition, such as an extra balance mapping, can significantly increase a protocol's defense mechanism.

This additional layer of accounting adds complexity for an attacker attempting to exploit the system. By creating more checks and balances, the protocol can detect and prevent unauthorized transactions more efficiently. It's about adding hurdles that make the effort required for successful exploitation outweigh the potential gains.

Rate Limits

Rate limiting is another strategy, especially in early stages. Implementing transaction rate limits during a beta phase can mitigate risks by capping the frequency and volume of transactions. This approach makes it harder for attackers to execute attacks that rely on high-frequency transactions. Although rate limits may seem like a temporary measure, they provide a crucial buffer period during which protocols can be tested in live environments with reduced risk.

Execution Fees

Incorporating small fees for specific interactions within a protocol can deter "looping attacks" and other exploit strategies that rely on executing a high volume of transactions. These fees add a cost element to actions that might be exploited, making it economically unfeasible for attackers to perform the exploit at scale.

These strategies exemplify how thinking beyond traditional security audits and bug fixes can enhance the resilience of protocols. By making certain attack vectors economically uninteresting, protocol developers can significantly reduce the attractiveness of their projects to potential attackers. It's about creating an environment where the cost of attempting an exploit far outweighs the possible benefits, thereby safeguarding the ecosystem and its participants from harm.